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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
\\ralker Bank & Trust Company,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent~

v.
Spencer C. Taylor, Bank Commissioner
of the State of Utah, and State Bank
of Provo, a Utah corporation,
Defendants-Appellants.

No.
9947

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF
IN SUPPORT THEREOF

Defendants-appellants respectfully move the court,
pursuant to Rule 76 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, to reconsider its opinion in this case, grant
a rehearing, and, upon said reconsideration and rehearing, to vacate its prior decision, reverse the judgment
of the District Court of Salt Lake County, and remit
the case with directions to dismiss the action with prejudice.
The decision should be reconsidered and a rehearing
granted for the following reasons:

3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1. In construing the language of 7-3:.6 Utah Code
Annotated 1953, the court overlooked the rule of statutory construction prescribed in 68-3-6 Utah Code Annotated 1953.

2. The spirit of the statute should prevail over its

letter whether or not the letter .leads to an "absurd"
result.
3. Applying the holding of the court to specific

fact situations will lead to absurd results.
;4. The result reached by the court raises serious

questions as to the constitutionalitv of the branch banking statute under .both the State" and Federal Constitutions.
Respectfully submitted,
Peter W. Billings
Bryce E. Roe
Fabian & Clendenin
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
State Bank of Provo
A. r.ratt Kesler
Atto!ney Gen~ral

H. Wright Volker
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
Spencer C. Taylor
Bank Commissioner
4
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BltlEF 0~, DEFENDANTS-APPELLI-\NTS
IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REHEARING
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This was a declaratory judgment action brought
by \ Valker Bank and Trust Company for construction
of 7-3-6 Utah Code Annotated 1953, particularly insofar as it governs establishment of branch banks in
cities and towns other than Salt Lake City. The trial
court and this court held that 7-3-6 Utah Code Annotated 1953 prohibits a unit bank in such a city from
having a branch in the city in which it is located, even
though there may be no other banks or branches there,
and even though the Bank Commissioner has found
that "the public convenience and advantage will be
subserved by such a branch."

ARGUMENT

I.
IN CONSTRUING THE LANGUAGE OF
7-3-6 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 THE

COURT OVERLOOKED THE RULE OF
STr\TUTORY CONSTRUCTION PRESCRIBED IN 68-3-6 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953.
In its decision this court looked generally at the
history of branch banking, noting that it had been pro5
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hibited by UtahJaw betw.een 1911 and 1933, but failed
to anal~ze; the meaning of 7-3-6 as of its first enactment (Chapter 6, Laws of Utah 1933); and a construction of the original statute was necessary because the
pertinent part 'of present 7-3-6 Utah Code Annotated
~95§ C()ntain~ language identical with that in the original
a~t. J:"'he, ~o~rt is required therefore, to apply 68-3-6
Utah ,Code _Annot~ted · 1953: _
''The provisions of any statute, so far as they
are the. same .as those of any prior statute, shall
be cons~rued_as a continuation of such provisions,
and not as a new enactment."
The -7-3-6 enacted by Chapter 6, -Laws of Utah
1933, contained the following language:

··" * * * No branch bank shall be established in
any city, town or village in which _is located a
bank or banks~ state or national, regularly transacting a customary banking business unless the
bank seeking to establish such branch shall take
over an existing bank or obtain the consent of all
banks therein located_, except that in cities of the
first class branS!hes may be established without
such consent; * * *" (Emphasis added.)
~

. ··The 1933 Legislature could not have meant that
a·· unit ·batik l6cated in a second or third ·class city in
-\Vhich it was the bnly banking facility could not establish
a· br:incn bank there, for all the bank would have had
to do was obtain its own consent-a senseless formality.
It follows that under the 1933 statute (before the consent pr9vision was declared unconstitutional in Union
Trust Company. v. Simmons_, 116 Utah 422, 211 P.2d

6
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190) a unit bank in a second or third class city was

authorized to establish a branch in that city. The phrase
"in which is located a bank or banks" could only have
referred to "a bank or banks" other than the applying
bank.
The pertinent provisions of 7-3-6 Utah Code Annotated 1953, presently before the court, are as follows:
"Except in cities of the first class, no branch
bank shall be established in any city, town or
village in 'which is located a bank or banks~ state
· or national, regularly transacting a customary
banking business, unless the bank seeking to
establish such branch shall take over an existing
bank~· * * *" (Emphasis added.)
The emphasized language is identical with the
language in the 1933 version of 7-3-6. Indeed, except
for deletion of the unconstitutional consent, the entire
prov1s1on IS substantially the same as the original enactment.
Inasmuch as the legislature in 68-3-6 specifically
declared its intention to be that identical language will
will be deemed to be a continuation of the previous language and not a new enactment, the. present 7-3-6
must not be construed to prohibit a unit bank fron1
establishing a branch in its own community unless there
is another unit bank there-the kind of bank fron1 which
the tmconstitutional consent once was to be sought.

7
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II.
THE SPIRIT OF THE STATUTE SHOULD
PREVAIL OVER THE LETTER WHETHER
OR NOT THE LETTER LEADS TO AN "ABSURD'' RESULT.
Perhaps defendants-appellants were over-zealous
in emphasizing the idea of "absurdity" while advancing
their construction of 7-3-6; and this advocacy may have
diverted the court's attention from its own decisions
that the spirit o£ the statute prevails over the letter even
though the letter might not lead to an "absurdity."
In Norville v. State Tax Commission~ 98 Utah
170, 97 P.2d 937, the court quoted with approval the
following statement from Sutherland on Statutory Construction~ §241, page 320: ·
"In the exposition of a statute the intention
of the law-maker will prevail over the literal
sense of the terms ; arid its reason and intention
will prevail over the strict letter. When the words
·are not explicit the intention is to be collected
from the context; from the occasion and necessity
of the law; from the mischief felt, and the remedy
in view; and the 'intention is to be taken or presumed according to what is consonant with reason
and good discretion."
And the following from Ozawa v. United States, 260
U.S. 178, 43 Sup. Ct. 65, 67 L. Ed. 199:
"We may then look to the reason of the enactment and inquire into its antecedent historv and
give its effect in accordance with its desig~ and
8
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purpose, sacrificing, if necessary, the literal Inean~
ing in order that the purpose may not fail."
The court not only approved the proposition that
words tnay be 1nodified, altered, or supplied, but did in
faet supply words to give effect to the legislative intention.
In Rowley v. Pu,blic Service Commission, 112 Utah
116, 185 P.2d 514, the court refused to adopt a literal
interpretation of a statute because it refused to believe
that the legislature intended to accomplish "an unreasonable if not absurd result."
'roday's courts, says Sutherland In his work on
statutory construction ( 2 Sutherland Statutory Constnwtion [3rd Ed.) §4702) usually consider the legislatiYe purpose "from the start," rather than "beginning
their inquiry with the formal words of the act." He
ppints out that:
"The literal interpretation of the words of an
act should not prevail if it creates a result contrary to the apparent intention of the legislature
and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit
of a construction which will effectuate the legislative intent. The intention prevails over the
letter, and the letter must if possible be read
so as to conform to the spirit of the act.'' (Id.,
§4706.)
1. Quaere, whether the letter requires the result even if the
letter is followed. In the phrase "in which is located a bank or
banks," it is not clear whether "a" means "any," "all" or "another." The article "a" is a word of uncertain reference. 1 Words
and Phrases (Perm. Ed.) 4 & 5. Likewise, "any." Kountzer v.
City of Omaha, 88 N.W. 117, 118. 63 Neb. 52. The significance
of the words must be found in their context. cf. Benat v. Mutual
Benefit Health & Accident Association, 191 Pa. Super. 97, 159
A.2d 23, 25.

9
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We also submit that .the court was incorrect in
stating that what the statute doesn't permit it prohibits.
The second _pa:r:agraph of 7-3-6 contains the following
language:
=.,

"With the consent of the bank commissioner
and the approval of the governor, any bank hav"ing a_ .paid-in capital and .surplus of not less than
$60,000~00 may establish a~d operate one branch
for the transaction of its business within this
state; .provided, that for each additional branch
established there shall· be in an additional $60,000.00 (capital artd· surplus)."
The later language limiting establishment of
is a proviso which takes. away from the bank
co~missioner some of the authority granted by the above
quot.ed paragraph. And, as said in Dunn. v. Bryan~ 71
Utah 604, 299 Pac. 255:
branch~:!B

"A proviso which operates to limit the applic:!ation of the provisions of a statute, general in
.. their terms, should be stri~tly construed to include no Gase not .within the l~tter of the proviso."
.The court poirtted·out that a statute must be cons~ide:r;ed_with reference to the object sought to be accom.plisbed by it, and that a proviso should not be so construed so as to destroy the general language.
The object of the statute as enacted in Chapter 6,
·Law of Utah 1933, was to grant banks in Utah the
right to establish branches, but with a limitation upon
the right of unit banks to establishing branches in areas
in which other unit banks were located: The consent of
10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ally other local unit bank had to be obtained. The statute
was not intended to prohibit branches outside Salt Lake

County except where they would infringe upon the
territory or draw from the customers of existing unit
banks.
The statute expressly grants to banks with the
requisite capital the right to operate branches, and the
proviso should not be construed to take that right away
from every unit bank located outside Salt Lake County.

III.
APPLYING THE HOLDING OF THE
COURT TO SPECIFIC FACT SITUATIONS
"\VILL LEAD TO ABSURD RESULTS.
In its opinion the court pointed out that since the
leg·isla ture has the power to prohibit branch banking,
it is not absurd for it to put restrictions upon •branch
banking. We agree. What is' absurd (or at least ''un~
reasonable") is an interpretation under which like
things are treated differently, and in which the distinctions in application of the statute have no relationship
to what the legislature obviously was attempting to
accomplish.
The means adopted by the legislature to restrict
some branch, banking must have some relation to a
legitimate legislative purpose; and in the instant case
the court sees a legitimate purpose in restricting
branches because unrestricted establishment of branches
11
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!linight impair the stability of existing ba~ks." But the
manner in which 7-3-6 would operate as interpreted by
the court has no rational relationship to the above (or
any conceivable) legislative purpose.
The decision does not affect the ability of State
Bank of Provo to have branches, to over-extend itself,
to engage in harmful competition, or to move toward
monopoly, so long as it branches abroad rather than
at home. It would be possible for the State Bank of
Provo to obtain branches in Heber and Tooele-both
on the. periphery of the Provo trading area- because
n.either of these cities has a unit bank (though both have
branch banks). But the court holds the State Bank of
Provo cannot have a branch in Provo because the State
Bank, itself, is already there, notwithstanding its presence has no relationship to the stability of any other
unit bank in Provo; and the effect of branching on its
own .operations and stability would depend on other
factors than whether the branches were within or without its home city.
Establishment of any branch in Provo by any bank
is now prohibited; but if an outside bank· were to
acquire the State Bank of Provo and make a branch
of it, the acquiring bank could establish another branch
or other branches in Provo, provided only that the bank
commissioner were to make the appropriate findings.
But the stability of banks, the healthiness or unhealthiness of competition, and the trend toward monopoly
would be the ·same whether a local unit bank branches
or a branch branches.

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Under the decision of the court son1e localities will
he virtually prohibited from obtaining adequate banking
services because the decision freezes the status quo.
The single unit bank must continue to exist alone. No
further services can be provided unless a new unit bank
is approved and the necessary capital can be raised.
lJ nder the decision-as shown by developments in
Layton since argument of this case-a local bank cannot
protect its competitive position by branching to tneet
the increased need for services. In that growing community the Cotnptroller of the Currency approved two new
branches for a national bank and eliminated the need
for a new unit bank; but under this court's reading of'
section 7-3-6, the branches will now be illegal, and
the existing Layton bank will be unable to grow with its
own community. It will have to grow elsewhere.
The Layton situation brings into focus another
factor under the court's reading of the statute which
will tend to "impair the stability of existing banks"-a result directly contrary to the legislative purpose
assigned to the statute by this court's decision.
If an existing local bank cannot provide additional
services to its community through the medium of a
branch because it is already there, the only solution to
the need for additional banking services is the chartering
of new unit banks. The Comptroller of the Currency
has been quick to exploit this. situation. The press is
filled with comments on his liberality in granting new
national bank charters throughout the country. In this

13
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state alone since 1962, he has granted seven new bank
charters in Moab, Provo, Draper, Salt Lake City, Sugar
House, Bountiful and Murray. These new unit banks
are under no state regulation and are exempt from all
state and local taxation other than the 4 per cent income
tax imposed by Section 59-13-2 U.C.A. 1953 under the
authority of Section 5219 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States.
It takes no specialized knowledge of the economics
of banking to discern that the financial stability of two
s1nall unit banks competing for business in one small
town is much less than that of one unit bank with a
supplementary branch in that same small town. This
court's ruling opens the door to economic attrition of
the state banking system from wide-open chartering of
national banks.2

IV.
THERESULTREACHEDBYTHECOURT
RAISES SERIOUS QUESTIONS AS TO THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BRANCH
BAN·KING STATUTE UNDER BOTH THE
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.
2. And perhaps to wide-open branching of previously chartered
national banks. In a newspaper article published since the court's
decision in this case, reporting an application by Utah National
Bank of Provo for approval of a BYU branch the national bank's
attorney is quoted as saying that the national bank was probably
the .only institution in Provo that could operate a branch on the
Y campus, in view of the holding of this court (Salt Lake Tribune
April 9, 1964, page B-9, column 1).
'

14
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The provisiOns of 7-3-6 Utah Code Annotated
195:;, as interpreted in the court's opinion, permit unit

banks in Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County to have
"local" branches but do not permit unit banks in other
cities and towns to have "local" branches nor to have
branches in their own counties outside their city limits.
There is serious question whether in this case the "population" or "location" system of classification is a reasonable one within the meaning of the equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution and the uniform legislation clause of the Utah Constitution
(An1endment XIV, Section 1, Constitution of the
(Tnited States; Article I, Section 24, Constitlltion of
Utah). ''rithout regard to federal decisions, this court
has struck down laws as containing unreasonable classifications in situations where the relationships between
the classifications and the legitimate legislative purpo'ses
were more clearly discernible than they are here.
This is not to st1ggest that defendants-appellants
contended in the original argument, or· now, that the
court should declare the branch banking law unconstitutional. 13ut the possibility that the question will be
raised in a future case, at a proper time, by the proper
parties, should be anticipated and the court should not
adopt a construction of' the statute which might leave
it no choice but to declare invalid the entire statute
relating to branch banking. Such a holding might lead
to a situation in which either all branches are held to
be illegal, or there is held to be no limitation whatever

15
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upon the rights of banks to establish branches in any
cities and at any times they may choose.
"When* * * [a statute] is susceptible of two
interpretations one of which would render it
unconstitutional and the other bring it within
constitutional sanctions, the court is bound to
choose that interpretation which would uphold
the statute * * *." Norville v. State Tax Commission~ supra~ 98 Utah 170, 97 P.2d 937.
CONCLUSION
The opinion as written disregards the meaning of
7-3-6 as originally enacted in 1933, and provisions of
68-3-6 U.C.A. 1953 declaring a general legislative policy

as to the rules to be followed in determining its intentions
in a specific context. Application of 68-3-6 should be
enough to justify rehearing and reversal. But if spirit
is to prevail over letter, if unreasonable or absurd results
are to be avoided, and if a col).struction is to be adopted
whjch will render the statute constitutional, the case
must be reheard, reversed, and remanded to the District
Court for dismissal with prejudice~
Respectfully submitted,
Peter W. Billings
Bryce E. Roe
Fabian & Clendenin
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
State Bank of Provo
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A. Pratt Kesler
Attorney General
H. Wright Volker
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
Spencer C. Taylor
Bank Commissioner
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